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Introduction 35
Healthcare-associated harm is estimated to occur in between 3% and 16% of hospital admissions. [1] [2] [3] In 36 primary care, between two and three patient safety incidents occur per every 100 encounters; 4 with 37 approximately 4% of these primary care incidents resulting in severe harm. (4) Over the past 20 years, 38 healthcare organizations, researchers and policymakers around the world have begun to pay increasing 39 attention to patient safety. Accumulated evidence about the extent of harm and underlying causes has 40 been translated into interventions designed to improve the safety of the healthcare system, 5 such as 41 incident reporting systems. 6, 7 The need to develop and introduce these systems was signalled within 42 the reports To Err is Human 8 and An Organisation with a Memory. 9 Their fundamental role is "to 43 enhance patient safety by learning from failures of the health care system". 10 The analysis of the 44 retrieved data from these systems provide valuable insights about the trends and patterns of patient 45 safety hazards at an organizational level 11 and can allow the identification of priorities for 46 intervention. 12 This information further bring opportunities to develop evidence-based models for safe 47 practices and support for education and learning. 11 Compared with other data sources, 13 incident 48 reporting systems can provide continuous, near real-time insights about diverse patient safety 49 incidents, including near misses.
50
Patient safety in primary care is a field that remains largely unexplored. 14, 15 In the United Kingdom (UK), 51 initial mixed-methods studies analyzing general practice incident reports from the National Reporting 52 and Learning System (NRLS) have shown their utility to categorize PSIs and identify patterns of 53 contributory incidents and contributory factors. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] However, patient safety research in dentistry is in 54 its early development. A recent scoping review on PSIs and adverse events in dentistry shows that, over 55 the past 20 years, this field has not employed standardized patient safety terminology and used varying 56 study designs and methodologies to investigate unsafe care. 21 As a result, the current evidence cannot 57 be generalised and provide reliable estimates of the frequency of incidents, their causes, or the 58 outcomes of these errors. To standardize patient safety research in dentistry, recent studies have 59 started to focus on the characterization of patient safety incidents, 22 including adverse events. 23, 24 Only 60 two studies have explored primary dental care data from national incident reporting systems, 22, 25 from 61 which one built an initial classification. (22) Although these classification systems provide a starting point, 62 they should be further expanded/refined and include a clear distinction between incidents, their causes 63 as well as the outcomes affecting the patient (adverse events) and healthcare system. Therefore, we 64 aimed, firstly, to explore data from the NRLS to identify emerging themes and then develop categories 65 and subcategories of incidents, their contributory factors, outcomes and degree of harm. Secondly, we 66 aimed to describe incident patterns through identification of frequencies of the relationships between 67 incidents and contributory factors. Thirdly, we aimed to describe the more frequent and harmful 68 reported incidents.
69

Methods
70
We conducted a two-stage cross-sectional, mixed-methods study of the NRLS with a selected 71 sample of reports from primary dental care for analysis. We combined qualitative methods and 72 iterative generation of data summaries using descriptive statistical and thematic analysis 73 methods. 26 74 75 Data source
76
The NRLS is a national reporting system created in 2003 for the NHS in England and Wales by the former 77 National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). It is one of the most comprehensive reporting systems in the 78 world. 27, 28 It consists of a database of incident reports submitted by National Health Service (NHS) 79 healthcare organizations, however, patients and other members of the public can also submit online 80 reports directly to the NHS. The NHS definition for the reported patient safety incidents refers to "any 81 injury or unexpected incident that could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving 82 NHS-funded healthcare." 29 Although reporting was initially voluntary, it has since 2010 been mandatory 83 to report any incidents that resulted in severe patient harm or death. The reports contain categorical 84 data (e.g. age, incident location and severity of harm) and three unstructured free-text fields to 85 encourage reporters to provide a narrative description of the event, perceived causes and potential 86 preventive measures. 26 Incident reports describing severe harm and death outcome are reviewed by 87 healthcare staff and safety experts responsible for the NRLS to identify opportunities for the continuous 88 improvement of care.
89
Sample selection
90
The complete data set consisted of 42,729 reports over a period of 8 years (between April 2005 91
and September 2013) from general practice in England and Wales. We applied the pre-coded 92
NHS categories "Primary care setting" and "Dental surgery" to filter the dataset and obtain a 93 sample of 11,836 records (see Figure 1 ). From these, we read the narrative descriptions and 94 excluded the reports not related to dentistry. As a result, a revised sample of 4,247 reports 95 was obtained. From this sample, all reports with a "moderate", "severe" and "death" 96 (combined total, n=257) outcome were included. From the remaining "no harm" and "low 97
harm" reports (n=3990), a random sample of 1,743 reports, weighted by year and the severity 98 of harm, was generated to prioritize more recent (2012-2013) and harmful reports. As a result, 99 a total of 2,000 reports were included for coding. The detailed sampling strategy is shown in 100
Appendix 1.
102
Methodology 103
An overview of the methodology is shown in Figure 1 . For the first stage, we explored 300 104 randomly-selected reports and deductively developed initial codes to structure the free-105 narrative descriptions of the reported incidents. This resulted in three coding frameworks to 106 describe what happened, i.e. type of incident (Appendix 2), perceived reasons the incident 107 occurred, i.e. contributory factors (Appendix 3) and incident outcomes (Appendix 4). These 108 frameworks present a hierarchical arrangement of first-and second-level codes that were 109 continuously refined throughout the study. System 18 and the results obtained from our previous scoping review. 21 The reports were coded 114 by the first author (EEC). Moreover, a second coder (AS) was trained and provided the same 115 sample of 300 randomly-selected reports and discussed with the main author, the challenges 116
and additional improvements to the coding frameworks. For the second stage, we applied the 117 coding frameworks on our weighted randomized sample of 2,000 reports. Following the 118 method described by Rees et al., 17 we applied the nine rules of the Recursive Model of Incident 119 Analysis 32 to structure the coding process (see Appendix 5). Following this approach, we 120 applied between one to four codes in chronological order to describe primary incidents, 121 contributory incidents and contributory factors. The main incident was labelled as a 'primary 122 incident', which was the closest incident to the outcome experienced by the patient. Then, 123
'contributory incidents' were defined as those incidents preceding the primary incidents. Both 124 primary incidents and contributory incidents were coded in accordance with the incident 125 coding framework (see Appendix 2). A 'contributory factor' was defined as "a circumstance, 126
action or influence (such as poor rostering or task allocation) which is thought to have played a 127 part in the origin or development of an incident, or to increase the risk of an incident". 33 128
Contributory factors were coded in accordance with the contributory factors coding 129 framework (see Appendix 3). Coding of the free-text narrative descriptions allowed the 130 categorization of reports by incident type, potential contributory factors, outcome and severity 131 of harm. This provided the basis for the subsequent data analysis. The severity of harm was 132 assessed using the WHO's International Classification of Patient Safety definitions (see Table  133 1). 30 To assess the inter-coder reliability, 20% of the reports (n=400) were double coded (EEC 134 and AS). Then, raw agreement and Cohen's K statistics 34 were calculated for the primary 135 incident. A kappa of >0.7 was sought between the two coders. Disagreements in coding were 136 arbitrated by a third person. 137 138
Data analysis 139
For the first stage, during the data coding, the reports were further thematically analyzed and 140 re-read for familiarization. If needed, new codes were created to capture additional semantic 141
(descriptive and in-depth) insights and latent (underlying or inferred) insights present in the 142 narrative descriptions and the circumstances (context) in which the incidents occurred. 35, 36 All 143 codes were grouped into themes and sub-themes to support our understanding of data and 144 the underlying reasons for incidents that might not have been captured by the quantitative 145
data. 35, 36 For the second stage, we undertook an exploratory, descriptive analysis 37 to generate 146 descriptive summaries to identify priority areas based on: (i) the most frequent incidents; and 147
(ii) the most harmful outcomes that resulted in moderate harm, severe harm or death.
148
Following the method used by Rees et al., 17 we employed pivot tables in Microsoft Excel 38 and 149 cross-tabulated the most frequent incidents per clinical stage with available contributory 150 incidents, contributory factor and their outcomes. We also cross-tabulated the degree of harm 151
against the primary incident types to identify potential relationships in the data. Then, we 152
identified additional patterns in the data by exploring all the frequencies of combinations of 153 incidents and contributory factors (e.g. primary incident + secondary incident + contributory 154 factor).
156
Ethics 157
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained from The University of Edinburgh's Centre 158
for Population Health Sciences Research Ethnics Committee. 159
Results
160
Of the 2,000 randomized reports, 1,456 were included in the quantitative analysis. Reports 161
were excluded if they did not describe a patient safety incident (n=311), were not related to 162 dentistry (n=125), concerned patient falls (n=31), contained insufficient details (n=23), dentist 163
harmed rather than the patient (n=18), or were about general non-specific complaints (n=6). 164
Raw agreement (86.5%) and Cohen's kappa (k) statistic for inter-rater coding reliability for 165 primary incidents was high (k=0.860; p<0.01).
167
Incidents 168 laceration/bleeding (6.9%; n=100), delays in using the dental clinic (5.8%; n=84), unnecessary 224
x-ray exposure (5.1%; n=74) and repeated procedures/additional treatment (4.9%; n=72). 225
Cross-tabulations of outcomes (n=1,456) with the degree of harm showed that 97.7% resulted 226 in either no harm or low harm (n=1,379), and only 5.3% were harmful (n= 77). The main 227
harmful ouctomes were unnecessary procedures (44.2%; n=34), anaphylaxis (9.1%; n=7) and 228 vasovagal responses (7.8%; n=6). Cross-tabulations of these harmful outcomes with the 229 primary incidents showed that all harmful reports that resulted in unnecessary procedures 230
(n=34) were due to to wrong-tooth extractions. Then, harmful reports involving anaphylaxis 231 (n=7) were mainly due to medication-related adverse incidents (42.9%; n=3) and 232 contraindicated medications prescribed/dispensed (28.6%; n=2). Finally, harmful vasovagal 233 responses (n=6) were mostly due to medication-related adverse incidents (83.3%; n=5). 234 235
For the main pre-operative incidents, frequent outcomes for delays in treatment (n=344) 236
included increased documentation/follow-up (23.3%, n=80) and repeated procedures or 237 additional treatment (5.8%, n=20) (Examples 18 and 19 in Box 1). Incorrect or unavailable 238 documentation (n=61) mostly led to increased documentation/follow-up (14.8%, n=9) and 239 delays in using the dental clinic (8.2%, n=5) (Examples 20 and 21 in Box 1). One breach of 240 confidentiality resulted in legal implications (3.6%, 1/28;). Secondly, for the main intra-241 operative incindents, procedural errors (n=227) included laceration/bleeding (41.9%, n=95), 242 chemical injuries (9.3%, n=21), repeated procedures/additional treatment (7.5%, n=17) and 243 thermal injuries (6.2%, n=14) (Examples 23 to 26 in Box 1). Medication-related adverse 244 incidents (n=161) mostly led to a vasovagal responses (64.0%, n=103) (Examples 27 and 28 in 245
Box 1). Equipment failure (n=90) mostly led to delays in using the dental clinic (34.4%, n=31) 246
(Example 29 in Box 1). Finally, for main post-operative incidents, contraindicated medications 247 prescribed/dispensed (n=15) led to increased documentation/follow-up and anaphylaxis 248 (20.0%, n=3 each) (Example 30 in Box 1). The majority of the reports concerning errors in the 249 process of delivering a medication did not describe harmful outcomes (75.0%, 9/12). 250 251
Discussion
252
To our knowledge, this is the first mixed-methods study of incident reports from primary care 253 dentistry, identifying the main incident types, their contributory factors and outcomes (clinical 254
and non-clinical). At a conceptual level, our methodological approach aligns with the Swiss 255
Cheese Model of System Accidents proposed by Reason. 39 Moreover, this mixed-methods 256 approach seeks to identify the chronological sequence of events leading up to error by drawing 257 upon the Recursive Model for Incident Analysis. This approach has been used in general 258
practice 16-18, 40, 41 and has received positive reviews. 42 We drew on a large national database of 259 incidents and achieved very good agreement between two independent coders. Our coding 260 frameworks enabled us to understand the relationships between incident types and 261 contributory factors which highlight opportunities to improve patient safety. 262 263
However, we also acknowledge that the reports analyzed likely constitute the tip of the 264 iceberg 43 as these only included events that were actually reported. Although the NRLS has 265 collected over 15 million reports since 2003, less than 1% of these reports originate from 266 primary care. 44 Whilst NHS healthcare professionals might be aware of the NRLS, their fear of 267 punishment from reporting incidents, the time required to report, and the lack of belief that 268
reporting will lead to change are all recognized barriers to reporting. 44 Also, our ability to 269 extract detailed information surrounding context (e.g. demographics and disciplines involved) 270
was limited as the reports were largely unstructured. Renton and Sabbah (2016) also reported 271 this data quality issue. 25 In addition, the free narrative descriptions were often shorthanded 272
and contained abbreviations or other jargon to describe clinical procedures. To bring sense to 273 the data and avoid the risk of confirmation bias, 45 we assigned codes which represented what 274 was explicitly described in the reports; inferences were avoided, in particular when no explicit 275 description was available. Therefore, following the rules from the Recursive Model of Incident 276
Analysis, we coded "primary incidents" as those closest to the outcome. Then, if available, we 277
coded "contributory incidents" as those incidents that preceded the primary incident. We 278
believe this work provides a starting point to systematically characterize future incident reports 279 from primary care dentistry (Appendices 2 to 4). 22, 23, 25, [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] 
281
Incidents 282
In our study, delays in treatment were the main pre-operative incidents and remained as the 283 most frequent among all incident types. Although these incidents were not harmful in our 284 study, their presence reveal flaws in the provision of efficient dental care. Nevertheless, delays 285
in treatment can still contribute to diagnostic delays, which can result in the unnecessary 286 clinical deterioration or complication of the patient´s condition or disease. 51 Therefore, we 287 recommend improving administrative processes by understanding the demand for dental care 288 services in the range of care contexts used for delivery. Guidance for the provision of safe, 289
reliable and effective care is available from the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), 52 290
including a dentistry-focused IHI Open School course in partnership with the Dental Quality 291
Alliance, established by the American Dental Association. 53 292 293
Our findings also revealed that procedural errors were the main intra-operative incidents and 294
the second most frequent among all incident types. Their frequency could be reduced by 295
determining warranted and unwarranted variations in clinical practice. This might be achieved 296 by reviewing compliance with evidence-based or best practice guidelines. However, an 297 emerging threat to patient safety is the increasing complexity of clinical cases and multi-298 morbidities as the population gets older by living longer. 54 Therefore, as discussed by Hollnagel 299 et al., 55 clinicians should also have flexibility to adapt their procedures in accordance with the 300 specific needs of the patient being treated. Equipment failure was the third most common 301
intra-operative incident and the fourth most frequent among all incident types. This type of 302 incident has been described previously by 47 Hiivala et al. 48, 50 and an issue 303 identified from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Manufacturer and User Facility 304 Device Experience (MAUDE) database. 56 Based on our findings, we believe equipment-failure 305 incidents can be reduced by having all staff members familiarized with the maintenance 306 processes and assign responsibility to team members to carry out this task on a periodical basis. 307
In identifying patterns of incidents, we also identified equipment failure as a "contributory 308 incident" for other "primary incidents" such as procedural errors and errors in obtaining or 309 processing x-rays. This highlights the interaction of healthcare professionals with sophisticated 310 tools and technologies could increase risk to patient safety, 54 and manufacturers should 311 support practitioners and staff to safely use their equipment. 312 313
In our study, wrong-tooth extractions were the main source of harmful incidents. Although not 314 frequent (2.7%), these have been studied previously 22, 25 and they meet the criteria of 'never 315
events' due to their severity and degree of preventability. 25, 57 Prevention of these and other 316
incidents can be achieved through the use available procedural checklists 58-61 to reduce 317 reliance on memory and thus, limiting the impact of distraction or inattention in the 318 occurrence of incidents. 62 A recent systematic review on patient safety interventions in 319 dentistry revealed that surgical safety checklists, which covers tooth extractions, 320 demonstrated efficacy to reduce or minimize AEs. 63 We also identified other less frequent 321
intra-operative incidents, which have been also reported in the literature. These include the 322 inhalation and ingestion of foreign objects, reported through the review of relatively small 323 samples of adverse event case reports, 49 malpractice cases, 47 and dental patient records. 64 324
Although not frequent, inhalation of foreign objects alone has recently been proposed as a 325 "never event" through international consensus. 65 326 327
Perea-Perez et al. 47 and Hiivala et al. 48, 50 also previously reported similar post-operative 328
incidents. However, incidents related to prescription of medications, or their dispensing, 329 remain largely unreported. 21 Therefore, the evidence base about medication errors in dentistry 330 needs further investigation. Medication errors involving antibiotics for example contribute to 331 antimicrobial resistance worldwide 66 and antimicrobial resistance is an emerging threat to 332 patient safety in the next 30 years. 54 Recently, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched 333 the third Global Patient Safety Challenge to minimize medication related error 67 and dentistry 334
should consider its contribution to this global agenda. 335 336
Contributory incidents and contributory factors 337
The majority of medical errors are due to faulty systems and processes. 8 Reason´s Swiss cheese 338
model of system accidents 39 shows that human errors are often a consequence of latent 339 organizational flaws, such as administrative or management issues. Our findings corroborate 340 this and revealed issues of accessibility to services and mismanagement of appointments, 341 insufficient staff members and lack of equipment maintenance. These issues were mainly 342 related, as a contributory incident or a contributory factor, to patients experiencing delays in 343 receiving treatment, which was the main incident reported to the NRLS. Although these 344
incidents did not lead to harmful outcomes, they reveal the underutilization of primary dental 345 care services. Underutilization of care is a prevalent issue in both high-and low-income 346 economies. 68 Factors contributing to this issue broadly include: a) inaccessible healthcare 347
services to the patient, b) the unavailability of effective services, for instance the result of a 348 lack of resources, c) the clinician's failure to provide effective care, and d) the patients' 349 (inadequate) compliance and adherence to effective healthcare interventions. 68 As the 350 organizational structure of dental care is likely to differ between countries and clinical settings, 351
we believe quality improvement strategies should be developed and implemented locally.
352
Distraction and unexpected movement from the patient were the most frequent "contributory 353
factors" for procedural incidents and wrong-tooth extractions. Vasovagal responses and lacerations/bleeding were the most commonly described adverse 360
outcomes. However, the majority of outcomes resulted in either no harm or low harm (94.7%; 361 n=1,379) which frequently resulted in increased documentation/follow-up, delays in using the 362 dental clinic, unnecessary x-ray exposure and repeated procedures/additional treatment. The 363
identification of these outcomes showed the presence of flaws in the provision of efficient and 364 effective primary dental care, which in addition to patient safety highlight two further 365
compromised aims of quality improvement, as proposed by the former IOM. 51 Moreover, the 366 over-utilization of healthcare services can: a) contribute to future unnecessary harm; b) result 367
in additional financial demands for the patient; and c) cause waste of resources within the 368 healthcare system. 69 369 370
Our findings have helped to identify priority issues for improvement and are a starting point 371
for setting patient safety research priorities in dentistry. 70 Patient safety in dentistry is still an 372 emerging discipline which needs to be further developed in parallel with the quality of care. 373
Health services researchers designing patient-safety-oriented interventions 51 should consider 374 the more frequent and most harmful incidents reported in this study. Policy makers could take 375 note of these emerging priorities and allocate resources accordingly. We believe this approach 376
will contribute to reduce unintended harm and support appropriate utilization of primary 377 dental care services. Our proposed priority issues can be pursued within research strategies 378 that embrace robust primary research designs and methods with agreed working definitions. 30 379
Examples of these research designs include mixed methods studies of a mix of complimentary 380 secondary data (e.g. medical records, malpractice cases). In doing so, priority areas and 381 knowledge gaps should be corroborated in local contexts, 71 as well as furthering advances 382 already made for data collection methods and taxonomies for patient safety in dentistry. 72 383
Natural Language Processing (NLP) could support the pace of progress and in terms of 384
analysing large volumes of data about unsafe dentistry offers a set of informatics tools capable 385
of transforming text into a structured format that can be used for research. 73 For example, 386
data extraction systems based on NLP have been developed in the medical domain. 74 However, 387 this innovation has yet to be explored in dentistry. Incident reporting systems, such as the NRLS 388
in England and Wales, have generated many lessons to improve patient safety. The Council of 389
European Dentists' has already recommended the development of reporting systems in 390 dentistry, 75 and these should now be either developed exclusively for the profession or 391 integrated into existing reporting systems, such as the NRLS, now the Patient Safety 392
Information Management System led by NHS Improvement. Also, any further dentistry-393 focused initiative needs to be supported by clear regulations and policies that allow private 394
and healthcare-funded dental practices to report incidents, preferably to a single system. 395
Where multiple regulators have complimentary functions in countries, clear processes about 396 incident reporting are needed for the dental profession to follow. 76 397 398
Conclusions
399
Our study represents an important step forward into the characterization patient safety 400 incidents and their contributory factors in primary care dentistry. Initiatives to improve quality, 401
including patient safety, in dentistry should focus on improving the main sources of unsafe care 402 identified in this work. However, our findings also reveal that over-utilization of dental care 403
services is an issue that can be easily overlooked by researchers, policy makers and members 404 of the dental profession. As more patient safety focused evidence continues to emerge, this 405 needs to be integrated into evidence-based guidelines and compliance with these guidelines 406 needs to be encouraged through fostering a patient safety culture. Patient safety is an 407 emerging field in dentistry that offers a wide spectrum of opportunities for both research and 408 improvement. 409 410 global evidence. Qual Saf Health Care. 2010;19(1):42-7. 414 2.
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